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B. Regulation of Exports and Imports
IMPORTS - ANTIDUMPING - JURISDICTION - EXECU-
TIVE POWER - U.S. DUMPING LAWS - AUTHORITY
OF SECRETARY OF TREASURY TO WITHDRAW WITH-
HOLDING OF APPRAISEMENT PRIOR TO PUBLICA-
TION OF DUMPING FINDING - INTERNATIONAL
ANTIDUMPING CODE OF 1967 - JURISDICTION OF
DISTRICT COURT TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN
CERTAIN CASES ARISING UNDER THE CUSTOMS
LAWS.
Where there is no remedy available in the Customs Court,
the district court is the proper forum to seek judicial relief when
the Secretary of the Treasury acts beyond his statutory authority
- prior to the publication of a dumping finding based on a likeli-
hood of injury determination, the Secretary of the Treasury has
no authority under the Antidumping Act to order appraisement
of entries subject to a withholding of appraisement notice -
Timken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
This recent case raises the question of the authority of the
Secretary of the Treasury to withhold the publication of a dump-
ing finding after the International Trade Commission has made a
"likelihood of injury" determination. The case also touches upon
conflict between United States antidumping laws and the Inter-
national Antidumping Code.'
After determinations had been made pursuant to the Anti-
dumping Act of 19212 that Japanese roller bearings were being
1. For a brief description of the statutory procedure for filing and processing a
dumping complaint under the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, see the appendix
following this article.
2. Act of May 27, 1921, ch. 14 tit. II, 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§ 160-172 (1970 and Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter cited as the Act]. Procedural regu-
lations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury are at 19 C.F.R. § 153.1 et seq.
(1976).
The Act was enacted to prevent actual or threatened injury to a domestic
industry resulting from the sale in the United States of merchandise at prices lower
than in the country of origin. See J. C. Penny Co. v. Department of the Treasury,
319 F. Supp. 1023, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
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sold in the United States at less than fair value, and that these
sales were likely to injure a U.S. industry, the Timken Company,
a domestic producer of roller bearings, asked the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of man-
damus ordering the Secretary of the Treasury to publish his
dumping finding prior to the appraisement and liquidation 3 of
roller bearings. The Secretary had withheld appraisement as an
404 U.S. 869 (1971). If it is determined that goods are being "dumped" within the
meaning of the Act, duties are assessed in the approximate amount of the differ-
ence between the price of comparable merchandise sold in the country of origin. 19
U.S.C. § 161(a).
Generally, "dumping" is a form of international price discrimination in
which an exporter sells his goods in the export market at lower prices than those
prevailing in the home market in order to increase his market share of sales. Compare,
Barcello, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade - The United States and the
International Dumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 494 (1972), and Schwartz,
The Administration by the Department of the Treasury of the Laws Authorizing the
Imposition of Antidumping Duties, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 463 (1974) (both of which
urge greater limitations on the use of dumping duties), with Fisher, The Antidumping
Law of the United States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAW & POL. INT'L
Bus. 85 (1973) (which urges an expanding and extensive role for antidumping
duties). See also Marks and Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade,
7 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 327, 386 et seq. (1975). For an extensive listing of older
literature in this area, see Barcello, supra at 494 n.9. For a detailed economic
analysis of international dumping practices see, J. Viner, DUMrING IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1966).
The Antidumping Act requires the presence of two elements to justify the
imposition of antidumping duties upon an imported product: price discrimination
directed against the United States market in the form of sales of imports at less than
fair value (LTFV) and injury or threat of injury to a domestic industry. The De-
partment of the Treasury and the International Trade Commission currently share the
responsibility for the administration of the antidumping laws, though such was not
always the case. Prior to 1954 the Treasury Department had jurisdiction over both
the LTFV and injury determinations. That responsibility was divided into its present
form by the Customs Simplification Act of 1954, ch. 1213, § 301, 68 Stat. 1138 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 160), the primary motive being the contended expertise of the Inter-
national Trade Commission (then the Tariff Commission) in conducting injury
investigations. See S. REP. No. 2326, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954), and Hearings on
H.R. 9476 Before the House Ways and Means Comm. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-41
(1954). See also Schwartz supra at 476-480 recommending that jurisdiction over
all relevant dumping questions should be consolidated in a single agency, preferably
Treasury.
3. Appraisement means the ascertainment or determination of the value of
imported merchandise. Liquidation denotes the final computation or ascertainment of
customs duties on an entry. For all practical purposes the two have merged. See the
Customs Administration Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-271, § 204(a), amending § 19
U.S.C. § 1500 (1970).
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interim measure pending a final decision on the dumping com-
plaint. The Secretary sought dismissal of the law suit on two
grounds: 1) if the Secretary's actions were reviewable at all the
matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs
Court; and 2) the Secretary's actions were lawful. The district
court denied the motion to dismiss and enjoined the Secretary
from appraising the roller bearings until after publication of the
dumping finding. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held, affirmed: 1) the Secretary's actions were review-
able by the district court only and not the Customs Court;
4
and 2) where a "likelihood of injury" determination has been
made, the Secretary must publish the dumping finding prior to
the appraisement of entries upon which appraisement was with-
held during the investigation of the complaint.5
Jurisdiction
The Secretary argued that the district court lacked juris-
diction on the grounds that: 1) exclusive jurisdiction is vested
by statute in the Customs Court; and 2) if the matter is not re-
viewable by the Customs Court, then it is not reviewable at all.
The first argument is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (b) (1970)6
which gives the Customs Court exclusive jurisdiction over actions
under Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.7 Section 516 (a)
provides that American businesses may file petitions with the
Secretary of the Treasury challenging the Secretary's assessment
of dumping duties on imported merchandise.8 If dissatisfied with
4. 539 F.2d at 227.
5. Id. at 231.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(b) (1970) provides:
The Customs Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions brought by
American manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers pursuant to Section 516 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.
Congressional intent to create exclusive jurisdiction within the Customs Court is
manifested in the Customs Courts Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-271, 84 Stat. 274. For
a general history of the Act, see [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1869.
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
The Secretary shall, upon written request by an American manufacturer,
producer, or wholesaler, furnish the classification, the rate of duty, the addi-
tional duty described in section 1303 of this title [hereinafter in this section re-
ferred to as "countervailing duties"], if any, and the special duty described in
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the Secretary's decision, the petitioner must notify the Secretary
within thirty days that the decision will be contested. The Secre-
tary is then required to publish the decision and to furnish the
petitioner with such information as will enable the petitioner to
contest the "appraised value or classification of, or rate of duty
assessed upon or failure to assess countervailing duties or anti-
dumping duties upon" merchandise entering after the publication
of the decision. The petitioner will then be able to challenge
one entry at each port designated in the notice to contestY
section 161 of this title [hereinafter in this section referred to as "antidumping
duties"], if any, imposed upon designated imported merchandise of a class or
kind manufactured, produced, or sold at wholesale by him. If such manu-
facturer, producer or wholesaler believes that the appraised value is too low,
that the classification is not correct, that the proper rate of duty is not being
assessed, or that countervailing duties or antidumping duties should be
assessed, he may file a petition with the Secretary setting forth (1) a descrip-
tion of the merchandise, (2) the appraised value, the classification, or the
rate or rates of duty that he believes proper, and (3) the reasons for his belief
including, in appropriate instances, the reasons for his belief that countervail-
ing duties or antidumping duties should be assessed (emphasis added).
9. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (Supp. V 1975) which provides:
If the Secretary decides that the appraised value or classification of the
articles or the rate of duty with respect to which a petition was filed pursuant
to subsection (a) of this section is correct, or that countervailing duties or
antidumping duties should not be assessed, he shall so inform the petitioner.
If dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, the petitioner may file with
the Secretary, not later than thirty days after the date of the decision, notice
that he desires to contest the appraised value or classification of, or rate of
duty assessed upon or the failure to assess countervailing duties or antidump-
ing duties upon, the merchandise. Upon receipt of notice from the petitioner,
the Secretary shall cause publication to be made of his decision as to the
proper appraised value or classification or rate of duty or that countervailing
duties or antidumping duties should not be assessed and of the petitioner's
desire to contest, and shall thereafter furnish the petitioner with such in-
formation as to the entries and consignees of such merchandise, entered after
the publication of the decision of the Secretary at such ports of entry desig-
nated by the petitioner in his notice of desire to contest, as will enable the
petitioner to contest the appraised value or classification of, or rate of duty
imposed upon or failure to assess countervailing duties or antidumping duties
upon, such merchandise in the liquidation of one such entry at such port. The
Secretary shall direct the appropriate Customs officer at such ports to notify
the petitioner by mail immediately when the first of such entries is liquidated
(emphasis added).
See also 19 U.S.C. § 169 (1970) which provides:
For the purposes of [the Antidumping Act], the determination of the
appropriate customs officer as to the foreign market value or the constructed
value as the case may be, the purchase price, and the exporter's sales price,
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The Secretary argued that since Timken was seeking the
imposition of dumping duties, the procedures of Section 516 were
mandatory and the district court was without jurisdiction be-
cause of the exclusivity provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (b) .10 How-
ever, the court recognized that Section 516 procedures only allow
a complainant to contest entries made after publication of the
Secretary's decision." Since Timken was challenging entries that
had already occurred, no relief was available under Section 516."1
This led to the Secretary's second argument: American busi-
nesses did not always have the right to challenge in court the
duty assessed on imported goods.'" When Congress created a
cause of action permitting certain types of challenges by domestic
producers, it established a procedure and vested exclusive juris-
diction in the Customs Court.14 Any relief not specifically avail-
able under the statute continued to be unavailable just as it had
been before the passage of the statute.
The court rejected both arguments. Timken did not chal-
lenge a substantive decision relating to the need for or amount
of duty, the type of suit that Section 516 authorizes. Rather,
Timken alleged that the Secretary acted beyond his statutory
authority in revoking a withholding of appraisement notice and
ordering appraisement of roller bearings prior to publication of
the dumping finding (a finding that only needed publication to
be effective). The purpose of the suit was to require the Secre-
and the action of such customs officer in assessing special dumping duty,
shall have the same force and effect and be subject to the same right of
protest, under the same conditions and subject to the same limitations; the
United States Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
shall have the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties in connection with such
appeals and protests as in the case of protests relating to customs duties
under existing law (emphasis added).
10. Supra note 6.
11. There was no dispute as to what the dumping margins were and what the
consequential duties would be once the Secretary published a dumping finding and
future entries became subject to antidumping assessments.
12. 539 F.2d at 226.
13. See Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914) where the Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal of an action brought by the State of Louisiana, a domestic
producer of sugar, on the ground that the right to protest a customs assessment was
limited to importers.
14. Congress did not provide American producers with remedies to contest cus-
toms decisions until 1922. See Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 858,
970, which is now Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
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tary to perform statutory duties of a ministerial nature. 5 An
action of this type could not be brought under Section 516, and
the Customs Court did not have power to grant an appropriate
remedy.' Therefore, unless the district court had jurisdiction,
the Secretary's actions were unreviewable. But the court noted
that there is a powerful presumption of reviewability rebuttable
only by clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to
insulate agency action from review.' 7  The Secretary's second
argument failed to rebut this presumption.
The court acknowledged that federal district courts have no
jurisdiction in matters where the Customs Court has exclusive
jurisdiction. 8 But exclusive jurisdiction over a wide variety of
15. See 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
16. Implicitly, if there is no remedy available in the Customs Court, there can
be no jurisdiction in that court. In all the cases cited in note 18 infra, where a U.S.
district court was found to be without subject matter jurisdiction over a customs
controversy because of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in the Customs
Court, the court making such a determination ascertained that a remedy existed in
the Customs Court. The Customs Court has no jurisdiction to grant equitable relief.
Eurasia Import Co., Inc. v. United States, 31 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 202, 211, C.A.D.
273 (1944); Cummins-Collins Distilleries v. United States, 20 Cust. Ct. 93, 97, C.D.
1090 (1948); aff'd 36 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 88, 99, C.A.D. 403 (1949). Likewise, the
court has no jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Company, Ltd. v. United States Treasury Department, 60 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 85,
86, C.A.D. 1086 (concurring opinion of Judge Baldwin), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973).
17. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). See also
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) ; Asso-
ciation of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Fritz v. United States, 535 F.2d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 1976); J. C.
Penney Co. v. Department of the Treasury, supra note 2, at 439 F.2d 66; North
American Cement Corp. v. Anderson, 284 F.2d 591, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Eastern State
Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 280 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 891
(1960); Morgantown Glassware Guild v. Humphrey, 236 F.2d 670, 671 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 896 (1956).
These cases, for the most part, involved suits by importers seeking reductions
in or refunds of duties, and suits by American manufacturers seeking either the im-
position of higher duty rates on their competitors' imports, or the issuance of an LTFV
determination under the Antidumping Act. All of the foregoing actions were held to be
maintainable exclusively in the Customs Court.
In J. C. Penney v. United States Treasury Department, supra note 2, at 68,
the Second Circuit, while affirming that the Customs Court has exclusive jurisdiction
of all matters substantially within the customs laws, recognized the existence of an
exception to the statutory rule in situations where no adequate relief can be obtained
in the Customs Court. In North America Cement Corp. v. Anderson, supra note 14 at
592, which concerned an American manufacturer's suit challenging a negative LTFV
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antidumping cases does not mean that all such cases were within
the Customs Court's jurisdiction. Applying, therefore, the pre-
sumption of reviewability, and relying on cases permitting federal
district courts to exercise jurisdiction where no remedy exists in
the Customs Court, the court of appeals upheld district court
jurisdiction over Timken's complaint. 19
Congress established the Customs Court to provide a "com-
plete system of corrective justice with respect to matters arising
under the customs law. ' 20 It was, thus, the apparent intent of
Congress to vest the Customs Court with exclusive jurisdiction
over disputes involving the customs law and the administration
thereof. The decision of the court of appeals in Timken would
seem to conflict with this policy to the extent that it permits dis-
trict courts to review certain types of executive action under the
Antidumping Act of 1921. This observation is, by no means, in-
tended to impugn the court's judgment in Timken. Certainly, the
court acted in accordance with basic principles of procedural
fairness when it concluded that the aggrieved plaintiff ought to
have some judicial forum in which to challenge the Secretary's
illegal conduct.21 To have reached any other result would have
deprived the plaintiff of legal relief altogether. Instead it is sug-
gested that the splintering in customs jurisdiction recognized in
Timken Co. v. Simon be eliminated by appropriate legislation.
In the wake of Timken Congress should act expeditiously to
grant the Customs Court the powers necessary to allow it to re-
determination made by the Secretary, the court specifically distinguished suits
brought to require administrative action, such as Timken's, from suits that challenge
the substantive correctness of administrative decisions and acknowledged that the
former were properly brought in the district court. See also Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S.
606 (1918) (district court injunction issued against Secretary, upheld as proper,
where no other remedy was available to the importer) and National Milk Producers
Federation v. Shultz, 372 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1974) (district court has subject
matter jurisdiction in mandamus action against Secretary).
19. The court did not specify what statute conferred jurisdiction upon the dis-
trict court. See 539 F.2d at 226 n.7. Timken asserted that jurisdiction was granted
pursuant to a number of statutory provisions including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1340, 1361
(1970) and 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706 (1970). The court simply recognized district court
jurisdiction, pursuant to either the mandamus statute or the Administrative Procedure
Act, to entertain an action to require the Secretary to perform statutory duties of a
ministerial nature.
20. Cottman Co. v. Daily, 94 F.2d 85, 88 (4th Cir. 1938) (emphasis added).
21. See cases cited supra note 18.
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view and enforce executive compliance with the procedural
requirements of the Antidumping Act and other related customs
laws.2
Scope of the Secretary's Authority Under Section 16023
When the Timken Company submitted a complaint to the
Secretary of the Treasury alleging that tapered roller bearings
were being imported from Japan in violation of the Antidumping
Act, the Secretary in 1974 ordered the withholding of appraise-
ment from the Japanese roller bearings 4 as an interim measure
pending a final decision on the complaint. According to the Act,
a formal dumping finding can only be made after the Secretary
determines that goods are being or are likely to be sold at less
than fair value (an LTFV determination), and the International
Trade Commission subsequently finds that a U.S. industry is
either being injured or is likely to be injured. The dumping finding
becomes effective when both determinations are published by the
Secretary.'5
The Secretary made an affirmative LTFV finding26 for roller
bearings and referred the matter to the Commission, which deter-
mined that a domestic industry was likely to be injured.2 7 The
Commission did not find actual present injury; however, a "like-
22. One can imagine possible inefficiencies which might be introduced by this
split in jurisdiction. For example, in the present action, should dumping duties
actually be assessed on the entries in question in compliance with the Secretary's
dumping finding, importers could protest and litigate such assessment pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1515 in the Customs Court. That court would review the case de novo, ruling
on the appropriateness of the assessed duties. The present plaintiff would have no
right to intervene in such a case (though perhaps the Customs Court might allow it
to appear as amicus). The diseconomies inherent in the current division could be
reduced through consolidation of all custom issues in one court.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
24. Prior to the withholding of appraisement notice, an "Antidumping Pro-
ceeding Notice" was published in the Federal Register on December 4, 1973. 38 Fed.
Reg. 33408 (1973). On June 5, 1974, the withholding of appraisement notice was
published which ordered customs officers to withhold appraisement of entries of the
class or kind under investigation. 39 Fed. Reg. 19969 (1974).
25. 19 U.S.C.§ 160(a) (1970).
26. The Secretary published his affirmative LTFV finding in the Federal Register
on September 6, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 32337 (1974).
27. Tapered Roller Bearings and Certain Components Thereof from Japan; In-
vestig. No. AA 1921-143, Pub. No. 714 (U.S.I.T.C. 1974). The Commission's vote
was 4 to 2 in favor of an affirmative finding.
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lihood of injury" determination is sufficient under the Act. Had
the Secretary promptly published the dumping finding at this
point, all roller bearings imported after the withholding of ap-
praisement was ordered as well as those imported in the future
would have been subject to dumping duties. Instead, prior to
publication of the finding, the Secretary ordered the appraisement
and liquidation of those roller bearings that had been subject to
withholding of appraisement. This action would have had the
effect of making the dumping finding prospective from the date
of publication, rather than retroactive to the initiation of the
withholding of appraisement, thus allowing those roller bearings
previously imported and awaiting appraisement to flood into the
U.S. forever free from the imposition of antidumping duties.
On Timken's motion, the district court enjoined the Secretary
from appraisement of roller bearings prior to publication of the
dumping finding.28
Section 201 (b) of the Antidumping Act provides that a with-
holding notice remains in effect "until the future order of the
Secretary, or until the Secretary has made public a [dumping]
finding. 2 9 On appeal, the Secretary argued that the wording
"until the further order of the Secretary" authorized the Secre-
tary to apply dumping duties prospectively only because the
Commission determined that there was a likelihood of injury and
not actual present injury.
In support of his argument that Section 201 (b) authorizes
the imposition of dumping duties prospectively but not retro-
actively in cases where the International Trade Commission has
only found likelihood of injury,80 the Secretary asserted that a
"likelihood" finding by the International Trade Commission
means, in effect, that the plaintiff has not suffered actual present
injury, even though plaintiff may well sustain injury in the
future. Those goods which- enter the country prior to the time
actual present injury occurs, therefore, do not meet the statutory
injury requirement for the imposition of dumping duties. Thus,
the Secretary, it was argued, can appraise the goods, thereby
releasing them from all antidumping levies, prior to the publica-
28. Timken Co. v. Simon, Civil No. 75-0180 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 1975).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1) (B).
30. Timken contended that if the Commission makes an affirmative injury finding,
regardless of whether it is based on actual injury or likelihood of injury, the Secretary
is required to publish his dumping finding prior to termination of the withholding of
appraisement notice. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a).
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tion of a dumping finding. The court flatly rejected this argu-
ment as specious, noting that although predictions of future injury
are not always certain to materialize, the statute specifically al-
lows for the assessment of antidumping fines solely upon a finding
of a likelihood of injury in the future.31 The court also noted
that decisions of the Commission 32 were not consistent with the
Secretary's position, and that the Secretary's own interpretation
of the law prior to the promulgation of the Code was inconsistent
with his current argument. The interpretation of Section 201 (b)
adopted by the court is that the phrase "until further order of
the Secretary" is designed to permit the Secretary to rescind a
withholding notice only when a determination is made that there
was no dumping. Thus, the Secretary is authorized to rescind
provisional measures in cases where no dumping duties are found
to be justified.13 Of greater interest is the Secretary's second
argument in which he suggested that by applying the antidumping
duties prospectively, he was complying with the terms of the
International Antidumping Code (Code) signed by the United
States in 1967.31 Article 11 of the Code expressly prohibits signa-
tory nations from assessing dumping duties retroactively where
the dumping finding is based on a threat or likelihood of injury
31. 539 F.2d at 230.
32. See Portland Cement from the Dominican Republic, T.D. 55883 (1963) and
Steel Jacks from Canada, T.D. 66191 (1966) in both of which the Secretary assessed
duties retroactively despite a "likelihood of injury" determination.
33. 539 F.2d at 228.
34. 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431.
The International Antidumping Code was signed at Geneva, Switzerland on
June 30, 1967. It was the result of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations carried
out under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
between 1964-1967. The Code interprets and elaborates Article VI of the GATT
which represented an early effort to reduce unreasonable non-tariff barriers posed
by protectionist national antidumping laws. See International Antidumping Code of
1967, Preamble, Paragraphs 1-4. Also see Rehm, The Kennedy Round of Trade
Negotiations, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 403, 427-431 (1968) and Anthony, The American
Response to Dumping from Capitalist and Socialist Economies - Substantive Premises
and Restructured Procedures after the 1967 GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 159,
179 (1969). For a discussion urging broader acceptance of the Code, see Baroello,
supra note 2, at 524-558; and for a contrary view, critical of the Code, see Long,
United States Law and the International Dumping Code, 3 INT'L LAw. 464 (1969).
For a listing of earlier literature on GATT Article VI, see Barcello, supra at 494, n.8.
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rather than actual present injury.15 Had the Code provisions been
applied the Secretary might well have prevailed. The court ruled,
however, that the Code was not available to the Secretary. In
1968 Congress passed legislation which required that any conflict
between the 1967 Code and the Antidumping Act of 1921 be
resolved in favor of the latter, and that the provisions of the Code
could only be applied "insofar as they are consistent with the
Antidumping Act."36 The court of appeals concluded that, since
35. Article 11 of the International Antidumping Code provides:
Anti-dumping duties and provisional measures shall only be applied to products
which enter for consumption after the time when the decision taken under Articles
8(a) and 10(a), respectively, enters into force, except that in cases:
(i) Where a determination of material injury (but not of a threat of
material injury, or of a material retardation of the establishment of an
industry) is made or where the provisional measures consist of provisional
duties and the dumped imports carried out during the period of their applica-
tion would, in the absence of these provisional measures, have caused material
injury, anti-dumping may be levied retroactively for the period for which
provisional measures, if any, have been applied.
If the anti-dumping duty fixed in the final decision is higher than the
provisionally paid duty, the difference shall not be collected. If the duty
fixed in the final decision is lower than the provisionally paid duty or the
amount estimated for the purpose of the security, the difference shall be
reimbursed or the duty recalculated, as the case may be.
(ii) Where appraisement is suspended for the product in question for
reasons which arose before the initiation of the dumping case and which are
unrelated to the question of dumping, retroactive assessment of anti-dumping
duties may extend back to a period not more than 120 days before the sub-
mission of the complaint.
(iii) Where for the dumped product in question the authorities determine
(a) either that there is a history of dumping which caused material
injury or that the importer was, or should have been, aware
that the exporter practices dumping and that such dumping
would cause material injury, and
(b) that the material injury is caused by sporadic dumping (massive
dumped imports of a product in a relatively short period) to
such an extent that, in order to preclude it recurring, it appears
necessary to assess an anti-dumping duty retroactively on those
imports,
the duty may be assessed on products which were entered for consumption
not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures
(emphasis added).
36. Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201(a), 82 Stat. 1347 (1968).
The exact legal status of the Code in the United States after Pub. L. No.
90-634 is unclear. Congress never explicitly incorporated the Code into the municipal
law of the United States, although it may have done so by negative implication. Timken
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Article 11 of the Code conflicts directly with Section 201 of the
Antidumping Act, it was bound to disregard the Code provisions
and reject the Secretary's argument.
To summarize, this decision requires the Secretary to publish
automatically and without delay a dumping finding upon com-
pletion of the second step of the inquiry process - the determina-
tion by the Commission of injury (or threat thereof) to domestic
industry. This result is in harmony with the Trade Act of 1974, 3
which vests increased powers and responsibilities in the Inter-
national Trade Commission in the area of import relief, and
affirms the Commission's broader view of its own powers and its
independence."
J. Michael McGuire
Co. v. Simon is to date the only American case in which the question of the effect of
the International Antidumping Code in the United States has been raised. The court
of appeals found it unnecessary to consider the issue, however, since it determined
that the Code and the Antidumping Act were in conflict with respect to the precise
point raised by the Secretary. 539 F.2d at 231.
Ironically, the Code specifically provides that it is to supersede all pre-existing
national dumping legislation to the extent of any inconsistency. International Anti-
dumping Code, Article 14, 19 U.S.T. 4359. (Contrast the grandfather clause in the
Code's predecessor, which rendered that provision utterly ineffectual with respect to
the United States and various other major trading states.) By enacting Pub. L. No.
90-634, Congress effectively abrogated the Code insofar as the participation of the
United States was concerned.
For a discussion and criticism of the congressional response to the Code and
the resultant effect of the Code in the United States, see Barcello, supra note 2, at 533-
534; and Pintos and Murphy, Congress Dumps the International Antidumping Code
19 CATH. U. L. Rtv. 180, 192 (1969) in which the authors conclude that the Code is a
"dead letter as far as any active participation by the United States is concerned."
37. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974). The 1974
Trade Act made significant changes in nearly all areas of United States foreign trade
law. The Act included major amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (codified in 19
U.S.C. § 1801).
38. One of the primary objectives of the 1974 Trade Act was "to strengthen the
independence of the United States Tariff Commission." Report of the Sen. Finance
Comm. on the Trade Reform Act of 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
115, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoNr. & AD. NEws 7186. For an outline of the
changes in the structure and authority of the International Trade Commission wrought
by the Act, see Minchew, The Expanding Role of the United States International
Trade Commission, 27 MERCER L. REv. 429 (1976).
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APPENDIX: THE ADMINISTRATION OF A
DUMPING COMPLAINT.
Timken Co. v. Simon
An elaborate statutory scheme governs the administrative
handling of a dumping complaint.1 When the Secretary of the
Treasury receives information alleging that particular merchan-
dise is being or is likely to be sold in the United States at less
than its fair value (LTFV) 2 and that an industry3 in the United
States is presently injured or is likely to be injured by reason of
the importation and LTFV sale of such merchandise, the Secre-
tary shall determine whether to initiate a LTFV investigation.4
Should the Secretary determine that there is a possibility that
the allegations of dumping are correct, he shall then publish notice
of his initiation of the investigation in the Federal Register.5 If
it were decided that the allegations were unfounded, the inquiry
would close at this point."
The Trade Act of 1974" amends the Antidumping Act of
19218 such that if the Secretary, in the course of determining
whether to initiate an investigation has "substantial doubt" as
to whether an industry in the United States is being or likely
to be injured, the Secretary shall forward to the International
Trade Commission his reasons for such substantial doubt along
with any price information he may have available which concerns
possible LTFV sales.9 The Commission must then, within 30
1. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 160 et seq. (1920) and 19 C.F.R. § 153.1 et seq.
(1976).
2. For factors and computations involved in the LTFV determination see 19
U.S.C. § 161 et seq. and 19 C.F.R. § 153.2-153.18 (1976). Also see Art. 2 of the Inter-
national Antidumping Code, 19 U.S.T. 4348, 4349 (1967).
3. For a definition of "industry" see Art. 4 of the International Antidumping
Code, supra note 2 at 4352-4353. Also see Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp.
302 (Cust. Ct. 1961) and cases cited therein.
4. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1). There is a third possible category of injury to be
considered in the processing of a dumping complaint: whether a United States in-
dustry is prevented from being established by reason of the LTFV sales. 19 U.S.C.
§ 160(a).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1).
6. Id.
7. 19 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
8. Act of May 27, 1921, ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. II, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-172 (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2). For other changes in the Antidumping Act of 1921
enacted by the 1974 Trade Act, see [1974] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 7209-7210,
Also see the historical notes accompanying 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 160-172.
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days of the receipt of such information from the Secretary, make
a determination based on the preliminary information as to
whether there is reasonable indication that an industry in the
United States is likely to be injured by the importation of the
subject entries.' 0 If the Commission determines that there is no
reasonable indication of injury or likelihood of injury," the Com-
mission shall so advise the Secretary and any LTFV investiga-
tion by the Secretary then in progress 12 shall be terminated.
13
Should the Secretary decide that the dumping complaint
warrants further investigation, he must, within 6 months of his
initiation of the investigation, 4 determine whether there is reason
to believe or suspect that the imported goods are in the LTFV
category. 5 If the Secretary's determination is in the affirmative,
in order to prevent imported goods from being appraised before
a dumping finding is issued (which would allow them to escape
the subsequent subjection to assessment of an antidumping
duty) ,16 the Secretary is required to publish a notice of withhold-
ing of appraisement in the Federal Register as to such merchan-
dise entered or withdrawn from warehouses and, in his discretion,
10. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2).
11. It should be noted that this provision of the statute, 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2),
is drafted in the negative so that a determination by the Commission in the affirmative
has the effect of terminating the investigation while a negative finding continues the
inquiry.
12. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 160(b).
13. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2). In its first two determinations under this section
the Commission held in both instances in the negative, i.e., that there is a reasonable
indication of injury. See United States International Trade Commission, New On
the Highway, Four-Wheeled, Passenger Automobiles from Belgium, Canada, France,
Italy, Japan, Sweden, The United Kingdom, and West Germany, No. AA 1921-Inq.
1, Publication 727 (1975). The approach taken by the majority in these two cases
would seem to indicate, as expressed by Daniel Minchew, Vice Chairman of the
International Trade Commission, in 27 MERCm L. REv. 429, 436 (1976), that the
International Trade Commission will have difficulty reaching any affirmative findings
to terminate the investigation so long as these decisions are used as precedent. Further,
this would seem to run contra to the congressional intent to cut back on administrative
investigations which are an impediment to trade. SENATE COmMITTEE ON FINANCE,
TRADE REFORm ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 171.
14. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1) (A).
16. As pointed out in Timken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221, subjection of entries to
assessment of antidumping duties does not necessarily mean that they will be assessed;
rather after publication of a dumping finding, customs officials will assess dumping
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he may withhold appraisement of goods which entered up to
120 days prior to his notice of initiation of investigation.
17
If the Treasury Department makes an affirmative LTFV
decision, the Secretary is required to notify the Commission of
his determination and the Commission has 3 months from the
date of such notice in which to determine whether there is any
domestic industry being injured or likely to be injured by reason
of the LTFV sales.'8 Should the Commission's decision be in
the affirmative, they shall so inform the Secretary who shall
then publish in the Federal Register both his own determination
and that of the Commission which together comprise a dumping
finding for the purposes of the Act.' 9 After the dumping finding
is published in the Federal Register, all imported unappraised
merchandise described in that finding and entered or withdrawn
from a warehouse not more than 120 days before the original
notice of initiation of investigation was published is subject to
the imposition of an antidumping duty in the amount of the
difference between the cost of the imported good and the Ameri-
can good."
duties only if they determine that the market value of the entries in question is
higher than the purchase price or export sale price. 19 U.S.C. § 161(a). See also
Schwartz, The Administration by the Department of the Treasury of the Laws
Authorizing the Imposition of Antidumping Duties, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 463 (1974).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1) (B). Under the Statute the Secretary is authorized
to withhold appraisement of such merchandise "until the further order of the
Secretary, or until the Secretary has made public a (dumping) finding." 19 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1) (B). Merchandise covered by a withholding of appraisement notice can
not be released by customs officials unless a bond is filed to assure payment of any
antidumping duties subsequently assessed. 19 U.S.C. § 167 and 19 C.F.R. § 153.50-51.
18. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a).
19. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) and 160(d) (2).
20. 19U.S.C. § 161(a).
